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RETHINKING WELFARE RIGHTS:
RECIPROCITY NORMS, REACTIVE
ATTITUDES, AND THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM
AMY L. WAX*
I
INTRODUCTION
A spate of recent reports on President Clinton’s 1996 welfare reform initia-
tive, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(“PRA”), indicates that the new welfare regime appears to be working.  Al-
though results vary by state, welfare rolls have dropped dramatically as many
former recipients have gone to work.1  It remains to be seen whether the welfare
population is better off and whether current trends will persist if the economy
slows down.2  For the time being, welfare reform correlates with reduced de-
pendency on federal poor relief programs.
The public also seems pleased with the new welfare system.  Public opinion
surveys consistently reveal staunch support for key features of President
Clinton’s reform initiative, including work requirements for the able-bodied
and time limits on benefits.3  A majority of voters approve of providing services
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1. See Raymond Hernandez, Most Off Welfare Get Jobs, But Not All Long Term, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 1999, at A1 (citing a Rockefeller Institute study that followed 9000 single mothers leaving the
welfare rolls and found that two-thirds found jobs within a year); Hanna Rosin & John F. Harris, Wel-
fare Reform Is On a Roll: Working Poor Still Struggle, Study Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1999, at A1
(citing an Urban Institute study showing that welfare rolls have shrunk more than expected and a
Council of Economic Advisors report attributing a significant portion of this drop to 1996 welfare re-
forms); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES,
WELFARE REFORM: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VARIOUS WELFARE-TO-WORK
APPROACHES (Sept. 9 1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (documenting the drop in rolls and the transi-
tion of former welfare recipients to employment); DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES,
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 34-47 (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter HHS REPORT] (showing that most states are meeting work
participation rate requirements).
2. See Associated Press, Study Says Welfare Changes Made the Poorest Worse Off, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1999, at A13  (reporting that between 1993 and 1995, the poorest 20% of single parent house-
holds headed by women “lost an average of $577 a year, with incomes falling to $8,047 annually”).
3. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, National Perspective Welfare Reform Makes a Case for Boosting
Welfare of Working Poor, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at A5 (citing a 1998 poll of Democrats that found
74% support for maintaining recently instituted time limits on welfare benefits); Kevin McCabe &
Vernon Smith, Who Do You Trust, 23 BOSTON REV. 25 (1998) (noting a 1995 CBS/New York Times
survey in which 89% supported a mandated work requirement for welfare recipients); see also STEVE
FARKAS ET AL., THE VALUES WE LIVE BY: WHAT AMERICANS WANT FROM WELFARE REFORM 16,
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such as job training, child care, child support collection, short-term loans, and
transportation subsidies that help the poor become self-supporting.  The new
welfare reform package gives states the flexibility to make those services avail-
able.
Although the public staunchly supports President Clinton’s welfare reform
initiative, the academy has been somewhat more critical.4  What is notably
missing from the critique, however, is any call to place support for the poor on a
more secure legal footing.  No significant voice in the debate today argues that
so-called “economic rights” should be elevated to constitutional status.  The
debate proceeds almost entirely in terms of ordinary, or normal, politics.5
This is not surprising.  Establishing an unassailable right to welfare was once
an important goal of legal academics and activists, but is no longer.  Initially, the
objective was not to amend the Constitution, but to identify within it previously
unrecognized, positive entitlements for citizens and affirmative duties for gov-
ernment.6  Although academicians still make fitful efforts along these lines,7 liti-
44-46 (1996) (documenting majority support for time limits and work requirements).  Cf. MARTIN
GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY
POLICY 189 (1999) (noting that support for time limits is somewhat equivocal because voters recognize
that individual circumstances may make them harsh for some).
The key features of the Clinton plan are a phased-in schedule of work requirements for recipients of
federal cash assistance and a lifetime limit on benefits.  Generally, persons receiving benefits are re-
quired to work at private or workfare jobs for a designated number of hours each week after two years
on welfare.  States may impose a stricter work schedule, but may also exempt up to one-fifth of recipi-
ents from work requirements.  There is also a firm five-year lifetime limit on benefits, which states may
shorten at their option.  For PRA requirements, see, e.g., DAN BLOOM, AFTER AFDC: WELFARE-TO-
WORK CHOICES AND CHALLENGES FOR STATES 91-97, at 113-16 (1997) (describing states’ options and
detailing work participation rate requirements for states); HHS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8, 139-40,
171-81 (reporting that currently 20 states require immediate participation in work, six require participa-
tion between 45 days and six months of receipt of cash assistance, 23 require participation within 24
months, and two within other timeframes, and noting that 28 states impose the federal five-year time
limit, six states use “intermittent” time limits, eight states use shorter limits, five use options involving
supplements for families exceeding the five-year limit, and five are applying limits for adults only).
4. See, e.g., Peter Edelman, Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First Century, Seventh
Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban Challenges, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 685, 685
(1998) (deploring that “[s]tatutory frameworks governing the poor are less and less friendly”); Peter
Edelman, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Implications for Welfare Reform in
the United States, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 285, 286 (1998) (challenging the conventional wisdom
that shrinking welfare rolls reflect the success of welfare reform).  See generally Sheryll Cashin, Feder-
alism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999) (criticizing welfare reform generally and devolution of authority to the
states in particular).
5. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991) (distinguishing between constitu-
tional politics, which results in changes to the fundamental charter of government, and “normal” or
“ordinary” politics, which is the process of legislative or executive decisionmaking within the existing
constitutional framework).
6. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986) (proposing to ground a constitutional right to welfare in the preamble’s
reference to “the general welfare” and the rights to life and happiness featured in the Declaration of
Independence); Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS 182 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) (locating an implicit right to welfare in the idea of
due process); Frank I. Michelman, States’ Rights and States’ Roles: Permutations of “Sovereignty” in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977) (suggesting a constitutional welfare right
may be derived from the Supreme Court’s state sovereignty jurisprudence); Frank I. Michelman, The
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gators rarely do.8  The diminishing interest in this project is partly a product of
the courts’ decisive rejection of the notion that the federal Constitution, as cur-
rently written, requires government to reduce inequality and relieve want.9
Consequently, proponents of a right to basic economic security have all but
given up on constitutional exegesis in favor of normative ideal theory.  Drawing
on liberal theorists like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, scholars have asked
what a liberal, democratic society should provide by way of assistance to the
least well off or, even more broadly, to all its citizens.  These discussions implic-
itly recognize that our present system diverges from what a liberal society de-
Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause extends logically to the protection
of certain minimum entitlements); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 (attempting to apply John Hart Ely’s process-based theory of constitutional
interpretation to derive welfare rights); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Un-
derenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (relying on a thesis of underenforce-
ment to argue that Supreme Court decisions do not negate the existence of a constitutional right to wel-
fare within valid, constitutionally sanctioned norms); Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League
of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1065 (1977) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s protection of states’ interests against the federal
government reflects constitutional deference to popular expectations, including welfare rights); see also
MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973
(1993) (tracing the evolution of poverty-law litigation strategies); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE
LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994) (suggesting that statutory arguments are more likely
to secure broad welfare rights than those resting on constitutional interpretation); Matthew Diller,
Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401 (1995) (concluding that the future of
poverty-law litigation is one of small victories rather than a dramatic sea change in constitutional inter-
pretation); Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY
ARE—WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reluc-
tance to announce a minimum welfare right).
7. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitle-
ments, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (1990) (suggesting that the Reconstruction Amendments imply
a welfare right); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990)
(arguing that the traditional view according to which the Constitution protects only negative liberties
rests on the faulty assumption that the public and private spheres are neatly separable); Erwin Chem-
erinsky, Making the Right Case for a Constitutional Right to Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERCER L.
REV. 525 (1993) (suggesting ways around the traditional assumption that the Constitution does not
guarantee affirmative rights); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 211 (1993) (using John Rawls’s theories to ground a constitutional interpretation that justifies the
constitutional protection of welfare rights); William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from
All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771
(1994) (using historical and moral arguments to construct a defense of constitutional welfare rights).
8. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 6, at 1417-24.
9. A recent article in the Harvard Law Review is typical of the abandonment by academics (and
poverty activists) of any attempt to interpret the federal Constitution to confer a right to support by the
government.  Helen Hershkoff, a former high-profile anti-poverty litigator, shifts the battleground
away from the federal Constitution, arguing that courts should take a more activist approach to state
constitutional provisions imposing affirmative obligations to provide for the poor.  See generally Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1131 (1999).  See also Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1403 (1999) (arguing that state courts need not model their interpretations of state
constitutional welfare rights provisions on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitu-
tion); William C. Rava, State Constitutional Protections for the Poor, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 543 (1999) (de-
tailing various state constitutional protections for welfare rights, but concluding that state courts, influ-
enced by federal standards of constitutional interpretation, are not likely to give much force to these
provisions).
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fensible on first principles might recommend.10  Ours is a regime that permits,
but does not require, quite extensive redistribution of resources.  As such, the
choice of whether and how to aid the poor is not built into the basic political
order, but rather is relegated to ordinary, or normal, processes of democratic
governance.11
The normative and theoretical questions of what entitlements citizens
should have and what duties liberal democratic governments should assume are
clearly distinct from the issue of what legal and institutional status should be ac-
corded obligations and rights.  Perhaps liberal democratic societies, to be re-
garded as just, should make some provision for the poor.  Does it follow that
such provision should be guaranteed as part of the constitutional order?  Even
theorists who attempt to justify affirmative economic rights as a fundamental
component of just liberal societies differ in their views of how those economic
rights should be secured, and who should have the authority to decide upon
their precise contours.12  Nonetheless, the belief is currently widespread that
welfare programs for the poor in particular, and programs of economic redistri-
bution in general, are quite important and even central to the basic well-being
of citizens.  It is not immediately apparent, and it is no easy question, why eco-
nomic rights should not be regarded as fundamental and given as much protec-
tion as other entitlements in our basic charter of government.13
10. For example, our political order almost certainly is not the one contemplated in John Rawls’s
political theory, if only because we tolerate sharp inequalities that do nothing to help the least well-off,
thus violating his “difference” principle.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-83, 150-61
(1971) (“Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and fair equality of oppor-
tunity, the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a
scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society.”  Id. at 75.).
11. This article uses the term “ordinary politics” without explication because an exploration of the
normative and positive aspects of our majoritarian democratic system is beyond its scope.  Scholars
have arrived at no definitive consensus on how majoritarian politics really ought to work and what an
untainted expression of majority sentiment would look like.  See, e.g., Einar Elhauge, Does Interest
Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 34 (1991) (asserting that “any
defects in the political process identified by interest group theory depend on implicit normative base-
lines and thus do not stand independent of substantive conclusions about the merits of particular politi-
cal outcomes”).  Cf. Cashin, supra note 4 (arguing that key features of poverty programs should be
fixed at the federal, rather than the state, level because the state politics of welfare are plagued by un-
desirable “distortions,” but failing to identify the hallmarks of undistorted welfare politics).
12. See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER 385-99 (1952) (arguing against inviolate property rights, and concluding that the
legislature is free to balance various property and liberty interests); RAWLS, supra note 10, at 195-201
(placing principal responsibility for adopting policies consistent with economic justice on the legisla-
ture, which has access to information about specific social and economic characteristics of the society).
13. See, e.g., BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE : ROBERT HALE
AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998) (describing Robert Hale’s realist critique of
the traditional distinction between public and private activity and negative and positive rights);
STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES
199-203 (1999) (suggesting there is no principled basis for distinguishing between positive or affirmative
rights, such as the right to basic support by government, and traditional negative liberties enshrined in
the Constitution); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing that benefits
conferred by government are as vital to freedom and security as traditional forms of property); see also
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 69-75 (1993); Bandes, supra note 7 (attacking the
distinction between positive and negative rights); Forbath, supra note 7 (same); William W. Van Al-
styne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439,
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This article seeks a fresh perspective on the old question of whether our
federal Constitution should properly include a right to basic economic security.
Assuming such rights are not currently protected, are there reasons to favor
constitutionalizing welfare within our political and economic system?  It is gen-
erally assumed that constitutional rights stand as countermajoritarian guaran-
tees against the forces of ordinary politics.  In theory, they should serve as
trumps, or inviolate protections, against majority will.14  Of course, they need
not function in this way.  At any point in time, most voters may approve of what
the Constitution requires.  In that case, the countermajoritarian function is, in
effect, superfluous.  However, the conventional understanding is that constitu-
tionalization at least offers the potential for sheltering entitlements from ma-
jority will.  Proponents of elevating an entitlement to constitutional status might
therefore base their position on some account of why entrusting a matter to the
political majority would be unwise or unjust, or would undermine important
objectives or values.
Whether writing welfare rights into the Constitution would even potentially
make any difference to anyone depends on what is meant by that designation.
Social assistance programs in modern welfare states fall into two general cate-
gories.  The first is modelled on social insurance, with contributions most often
tied to employment.  The second is categorical assistance based on need.  Need-
based assistance is the dominant model for poor relief at all levels of govern-
ment in this country today.  But the term “need,” both in ordinary discourse
and as used to describe programs and policies, is notoriously slippery.  “Need”
admits of at least two possible meanings:  One is static and asset-based.  It looks
only to resources and not to the potential for self-help.  The other is a more dy-
namic conception that takes into account history and volition.  On the latter
view, need-based aid would be denied to those who could take steps to avoid
destitution or could properly be held responsible for the persistence of their
situation.  On an even more stringent view, destitution due to improper or irre-
sponsible past behaviors would negate need, even if self-help were currently out
of reach.  Dynamic notions of economic need give rise to the age-old distinction
between the deserving poor (who are traditionally considered entitled to assis-
tance) and the undeserving poor (who are not).15
1461-62 (1968) (outlining the unraveling of the traditional distinction between rights and privileges).
But see, e.g., DAVID KELLEY, A LIFE OF ONE’S OWN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE WELFARE
STATE (1998) (arguing that government should protect only negative rights); Robert H. Bork, Com-
mentary: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695;
Richard Epstein, The Uncertain Quest for Welfare Rights, 1985 BYU L. REV. 201; Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
Changing Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the Law to the Welfare State, 1979 WASH. U.
L.Q. 741; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP.
CT. REV. 41.
14. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977) (“Individual rights are
political trumps held by individuals.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 727, 736-39 (1995) (discussing the conception of rights as trumps).
15. See, e.g., DAVID SCHMIDTZ & ROBERT E. GOODIN, SOCIAL WELFARE AND INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY 4-7 (1998) (introducing the distinction between static and dynamic views of poverty
and linking these views to ideas of the deserving and undeserving poor).
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Support for a basic right to government assistance need not entail the rejec-
tion of these traditional categorical distinctions.  It is possible to conceive of a
constitutional provision that recognizes an indefeasible right to government
help, but only for those in need through no fault of their own or who consent to
work in exchange for assistance.  Historically, however, advocates of a constitu-
tional entitlement to economic security have favored a robust protection that
does not impose stringent tests of need or serious obligations on the poor.16
These advocates have recognized that constitutionalization at least provides the
potential to downplay or even banish the deserving/undeserving distinction
from the arena of poor relief.  The push to enshrine welfare rights in the consti-
tution has thus come to be identified, if not logically then ideologically, with
something like an unconditional right to government aid—as with an entitle-
ment to a basic income regardless of need, or an automatic need-based transfer
regardless of opportunities for self-help.17
In asking whether we should give constitutional recognition to basic eco-
nomic rights as so defined, this article leaves aside the difficult normative ques-
tion of what kinds of welfare programs justice requires in a liberal democratic
society.18  Nor does it address the myriad institutional objections that might be
made against elevating welfare rights to constitutional status.19  Rather, it ex-
amines the consequences of creating a constitutional right to welfare by con-
trasting that state of affairs with the expected outcome of ordinary politics.  It
proceeds by developing a theory of how voters will tend to think about govern-
ment welfare programs by looking to expected reactions to individuals’ de-
pendence on others’ productive efforts.  It predicts that voters generally will be
16. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 6; MELNICK, supra note 6.
17. See, e.g., MARTIN ANDERSON,  WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM
IN THE UNITED STATES (1978) (providing a history of guaranteed income proposals and empirical
work on their effects on behavior); SAMUEL BRITTAN & STEVEN WEBB, BEYOND THE WELFARE
STATE: AN EXAMINATION OF BASIC INCOMES IN A MARKET ECONOMY (1990) (arguing for guaran-
teed basic income); PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, ARGUING FOR BASIC INCOME: ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS
FOR A RADICAL REFORM (1992); PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF
ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? 32-35 (1995) (arguing that “real-freedom-for-all” requires the
government to provide the highest universal unconditional income for all “consistent with . . . self-
ownership”); Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge To Employment Subsidies, 108
YALE L.J. 967, 981, 990-92 (1999) (discussing van Parijs’s suggestion that justice requires a liberal re-
gime to pay a basic, universal, guaranteed income at the highest sustainable level).  Van Parijs favors
giving all citizens a basic income regardless of work effort or earnings.  A more restrictive form of basic
income, of which President Nixon’s proposed Family Assistance Plan is an example, provides for a
broad-based means-tested transfer with a phase-out as earnings increase.  The only requirement for re-
ceiving aid under the Nixon plan was low earnings, regardless of the reason for “need.”  A means-
tested program can be structured as a cash grant or negative income tax and is cheaper than a straight,
universal, guaranteed income, but creates rather different behavioral and economic incentives.  See
generally VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM, supra, and VAN PARIJS, ARGUING FOR BASIC INCOME, supra.
18. See generally Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: the Liberal Case Against Welfare Work
Requirements (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
19. These objections relate to the effect on the balance of power among the three branches of gov-
ernment, the courts’ competence to administer positive entitlements, and the compatability of a right to
government financial assistance with other features of our economy, our system of government, or the
pre-existing constitutional order.  See, e.g., KELLEY, supra note 13; Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra
note 9.
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hostile to such dependency unless those seeking support have made a good-
faith effort to escape poverty and have exhausted all reasonable means of sup-
porting themselves.  It investigates whether this theory squares with voters’ pro-
fessed views.  It suggests that fundamental and innate attitudes which have
evolved over millennia to facilitate group sharing and cooperation exert a
strong influence on popular attitudes towards poor relief and towards social
welfare policies generally in democratic societies.  A deep-seated expectation of
reciprocal cooperation from group members and a reflexive hostility to those
who would free-ride on others’ productive efforts may help explain the tena-
cious distinction between the deserving and undeserving that pervades the poli-
tics of redistribution of government resources.  Although mandates that run
contrary to this ideology may be economically feasible in advanced industrial
societies, such programs are unlikely to receive the long-term support of the
citizenry.  An unconditional promise of generous economic assistance at public
expense will strike most citizens as unfair and will therefore meet staunch resis-
tance form the great majority of voters.  Although constitutionalization would
appear to be the ideal device for resisting majority sentiment in this area, that
device probably will not work.  Recent scholarship suggests that constitutional
provisions cannot long resist popular will.  That may be especially true of enti-
tlements that flout fundamental moral categories and run contrary to basic no-
tions of fairness.
II
POOR RELIEF AS A MUTUAL AID “GAME”
The analysis begins with the premise that centralized systems of social assis-
tance, which are a cardinal feature of the modern welfare state, have taken over
a role that private, informal institutions used to play  in more remote periods of
human history.  Welfare programs can be viewed as establishing a pool of re-
sources, drawn from common assets, to protect citizens against misfortune,
hardship, and the vicissitudes of economic life.  To this extent, welfare programs
bear some loose resemblance to private mutual insurance funds, which were a
common feature of nineteenth and twentieth century working life.20  To create
these institutions, workers raised money by collecting a small sum from each in-
dividual in the group.  Each member then became entitled to draw from the
pool of resources upon the occurrence of an event that deprived the person of
an independent means of livelihood or gave rise to some special need, such as
illness, loss of employment, or family disaster.
20. See, e.g., KELLEY, supra note 13, at 31-61 (discussing the historical process by which govern-
ment-sponsored welfare programs replaced private mutual aid orgainizations); MARVIN OLASKY, THE
TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992); SCHMIDTZ & GOODIN, supra note 15, at 63-72 (de-
scribing the history of friendly societies before the rise of the welfare state and suggesting that these
organizations successfully collectivized responsibility).  See generally ROBERT SUGDEN, THE
ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION, AND WELFARE (1986).
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These “friendly societies” or “sickness clubs” were voluntary, informal
schemes held together by members’ mutual cooperation.21  There was no cen-
tralized mechanism for enforcing compliance with the organization’s require-
ments.  Maintaining a viable fund under these circumstances was a variation on
the well-known “commons” problem.22  The challenge was to avoid the “tragedy
of the commons” that resulted from members withdrawing too many resources
and contributing too little to the common asset.  To forestall this sequence, the
insurance group had to devise and adhere to rules that ensured a stable balance
between withdrawal and contribution, and that persuaded members to stay
within the group.
The economist Robert Sugden has suggested that informal, voluntary group
insurance funds, resembling traditional friendly societies, can be modeled as a
multi-round, mutual insurance game.23  The rules of Sugden’s “mutual aid”
game dictate that each participant must contribute (that is, function as a “co-
operator” or “donor”) on each round of the game, unless he qualifies as a “re-
cipient” by suffering some chance setback that entitles him or her to withdraw
from the fund.  As Sugden notes, it is open to individual members of the mutual
aid collective to adopt different strategies for playing the game as a function of
what others in the group do.  Sugden shows that defection on every round is an
equilibrium strategy for playing the game.  It is always rational for a member to
“defect”—that is, to refuse to contribute to the fund on any given round—for
the same reason it is rational to defect in the prisoner’s dilemma game.  The
payoffs to individuals are higher when they can withdraw from the fund in an
emergency without contributing anything to the fund’s maintenance.  As with
the prisoner’s dilemma, it makes sense for each individual not to cooperate
(that is, to fail to pay into the fund even if able to do so), regardless of what
others do.  If all adopt this strategy, however, the fund will soon dwindle and
collapse.
Maintaining a viable mutual insurance fund, like enforcing cooperation in
the prisoner’s dilemma, poses a collective action problem:  If all rationally
choose to defect, all are worse off than if everyone cooperated.  But coopera-
tion is not an individually rational strategy.  Some mechanism is needed to en-
21. See, e.g., MICHAEL HECHTER, PRINCIPLES OF GROUP SOLIDARITY 113-14 (1987).
22. See, e.g., SCHMIDTZ & GOODIN, supra note 15, at 53-58, 60-72 (suggesting that preserving the
integrity of mutual aid societies is a variant on the commons problem).  See generally ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
23. SUGDEN, supra note 20, at 122-28.  According to Sugden, each round of the game is played as
follows:
One player is chosen at random to be the recipient; each player has the same probability 1/n
of being chosen.  The other players are the donors.  Then each donor has a choice between
two moves, “co-operate” and “defect.”  If he co-operates, he scores -c; if he defects, he scores
zero.  The recipient scores Nb where N is the number of donors who have co-operated, and
where b < c.  The idea, then, is that each person has a chance of being in a situation (say sick-
ness) in which he needs the help of the others, and that the benefit he then derives from each
other person’s act of assistance is greater than the cost to him of assisting another person,
when that person is in need.
Id. at 123-24.
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force cooperation.  In the case of mutual insurance, the collective-action prob-
lem is potentially surmountable because the insurance fund is not a public
good.24  An individual who fails to contribute his or her fair share is conspicuous
to others and can be excluded from participation on the terms that would oth-
erwise apply.  Specifically, he or she can be barred from receiving funds when
tragedy strikes.  In accordance with this possibility, Sugden shows that there is
another strategy that produces higher payoffs for all players, but only if all (or
almost all) players adhere to it.  He calls that strategy “T1.”  Sugden shows that
T1, like “always defect,” is also an equilibrium strategy for playing the mutual
aid game, in that if other players follow T1, then any given player does best by
playing T1 as well.  T1 is a best reply to itself, and a unique best reply.  Under
T1, members cooperate only with others who have cooperated (that is, contrib-
uted their share) on the last round of the game.  Cooperation with a player con-
sists in permitting that player to become a recipient when misfortune strikes.
As part of the T1 strategy, members refuse to cooperate with “defectors”—that
is, those who have failed to cooperate by refusing to make their expected con-
tribution on the last round.  Defectors are forbidden to serve as recipients when
their turn comes.  They are barred from withdrawing mutually-generated re-
sources from the pot.  Only individuals in good standing (that is, those who
have played their expected role as donors on previous rounds) are allowed to
remain eligible to withdraw from the fund.
Sugden describes the T1 convention as one of “multilateral reciprocity and
of punishment and reparation.”25  The “convention of reciprocity,” as Sugden
terms it, “prescribes that individuals should co-operate with those people who
co-operate with them—but not with others.”26  The convention of punishment
dictates that members should always refuse to cooperate with those who do not
contribute to the collective and thus attempt to free-ride.  If everyone adheres
to this convention, a mutually beneficial equilibrium can be achieved.  That
equilibrium is good for everyone because the maintenance of a collective com-
mon fund provides everyone with valuable insurance against risk.
For proponents of informal cooperative self-help, Sugden’s mutual insur-
ance model would appear virtuous in two other respects.  First, the game he de-
scribes violates no libertarian precept, for nothing is taken from anyone against
his or her will.  In ideal theory, mutual insurance pools are noncoercive in the
sense that individuals can choose to withdraw from the collective at any time
without sacrificing anything except the benefits of membership.27  Second, the
voluntariness of these cooperative arrangements guarantees Pareto-
24. See HECHTER, supra note 21, at 116.
25. SUGDEN, supra note 20 at 127.
26. Id. at 146.
27. This aspect of Sugden’s game is highly idealized.  Few institutions of civil society fulfill the con-
dition of perfectly voluntary participation with costless and unimpeded exit.  Some social institutions
based on interdependency, such as families and religious groups, make exit difficult or involve consid-
erable investments and sunk costs and thus create the potential for minority oppression and Pareto-
inferior, or inefficient, rent-seeking transfers among members.  See HECHTER, supra note 21, at 47-49.
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improvement for all members.  Members will stay with the organization only as
long as they believe they will gain.  It follows that, if they achieve a stable equi-
librium, such groups are Pareto-efficient.  By definition, the group survives if
everyone is better off, which occurs only if everyone plays by the rules.  Ac-
cording to Sugden, that can happen only if players routinely cooperate with co-
operators, but also punish non-cooperators by barring them from receiving as-
sistance out of group resources.
III
MUTUAL INSURANCE COOPERATIVES AND REACTIVE ATTITUDES
Sugden’s analysis suggests that in an informal arrangement that provides
mutual insurance, stability can potentially be achieved if most people accept a
convention of “strong reciprocity,” which, for our purposes, designates the pro-
pensity to cooperate with cooperators and punish would-be free-riders.28  How-
ever, it is not immediately obvious why individuals would spontaneously adhere
to such a rule if there is no airtight assurance that others will do so as well.29
Moreover, punishing free-riders is often costly, which gives rise to free-rider
problems of its own as individuals will be tempted to leave enforcement and
punishment of defectors to others.30
Why might individuals involved in something like a mutual aid collective
come to adhere to a norm or convention of strong reciprocity, and why do they
honor it even in situations in which that behavior may be costly?31  An innate
tendency to behave according to a strong reciprocity convention is one possible
explanation.  If human beings possess a set of reactive attitudes or moral senti-
ments that impel them to engage in strongly reciprocal behaviors, they will ad-
here to the reciprocity norm regardless of whether others do so and regardless
28. The economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis have also used the term “strong reciproc-
ity” to describe a rule, which  corresponds in broad outline to Sugden’s reciprocity convention, of “co-
operat[ion] with others similarly disposed, even at personal cost,” and “willingness to punish those who
violate . . . norms, also at personal cost.”  Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passe?  Homo
Reciprocans and the Future of Egalitarian Politics, 23 B. REV. 26, 26 (1998) [hereinafter Bowles & Gin-
tis, Homo Reciprocans]; see also Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Reciprocity, Self-Interest and The
Welfare State, __ NORDIC J. OF ECON. (forthcoming).
29. See Sugden, supra note 20; Bowles & Gintis, Homo Reciprocans.
30. See SUGDEN, supra note 20, at 124-27 (explaining the temptation to externalize the costs of en-
forcement); see, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 352-54, 366-75 (1997) (describing the collective-action problem involved in the en-
forcement of community or extra-legal norms and arguing that the quest for esteem can provide the
basis for effective enforcement mechanisms).
31. Bowles and Gintis summarize the results of game-theory experiments which suggest that peo-
ple have a predisposition to cooperate with those who treat them with generosity and to seek revenge
against persons perceived to behave unfairly even in circumstances, such as ultimatum games and pub-
lic goods experiments, where that behavior is not strictly rational for individual players.  See Bowles &
Gintis, Reciprocity, supra note 28, at 1-12.  See generally JOHN H. KAGEL & ALVIN E. ROTH, THE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (1995).  See also MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF
VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 127-47 (1997) (discussing schol-
arly treatments of the psychological and economic underpinnings of cooperation and setting these
treatments in an evolutionary context); ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 163-84 (1988)
(describing the “irrational” adherence to norms of fairness).
WAX_FMT.DOC 11/14/00  10:58 AM
Page 257:  Winter/Spring 2000] WELFARE RIGHTS 267
of whether it is to their advantage in the short run to adopt this strategy for of-
fering support to others.  This tendency, if present in everyone, will function as
a mechanism of coordination that will enable individuals to cooperate for mu-
tual advantage.
A repertoire of sentiments that facilitates strong reciprocity may have de-
veloped under evolutionary pressure over the lengthy period in which people
lived in small groups without strong centralized governments.  Under those cir-
cumstances, the ability to engage in group cooperation may have carried a dis-
tinct adaptive advantage.32  The forces of natural selection would operate to fa-
vor emotional reactions, psychological predispositions, or cultural practices that
fostered adherence to the rule of strong reciprocity, thus facilitating mutual co-
operation.
Robert Sugden’s mutual-aid thought experiment suggests that a key to the
stabilization of some mutually advantageous but voluntary cooperative ventures
is the merciless punishment of free-riders.  One would expect to find a strong
propensity to feel indignation, resentment, and anger toward persons who fail
to contribute their fair share.  These feelings of resentment would motivate
group members to refuse aid to uncooperative individuals and to forbid them
from drawing on collective resources.  Only those who were willing to contrib-
ute, or had contributed in the past as expected, would be permitted to receive
aid from the group.33  As noted, the impulse to cooperate only with other coop-
erators and to retaliate against defectors will not be strictly consistent with any
players’ short-term self-interest, which dictates non-cooperation on every
round.  The suggestion is that emotions, not rational calculation, drive players
to adopt a strongly reciprocal strategy in a setting where group members under-
take to provide mutual insurance or aid in case of need.  The undercurrent of
strong emotions that attend responses to others’ conduct within such a setting
may enhance everyone’s willingness to adhere to the strong reciprocity norm.
Players’ awareness that others resent any effort to shirk and may retaliate
against that behavior will make everyone more willing to play by the rules.  In
effect, the emotions of resentment toward defectors and solidarity with faithful
donors functions as something like a “commitment” mechanism that fosters ad-
herence, and signals an assurance of adherence, to a rule of reciprocity that re-
wards cooperators and punishes defectors regardless of short-term benefits to
the individual.  By preventing individuals from acting from pure self-interest
and providing a mechanism of coordination, strong emotions make possible mu-
32. See Bowles & Gintis, Homo Reciprocans, supra note 28, at 4-7 (discussing anthropological evi-
dence of the advantages of group cooperation).
33. Denying funds to defectors and supplying funds to cooperators are not the only measures that
could serve to reinforce the reciprocity norm and strengthen the equilibrium in the mutual insurance
setting.  Other behaviors to enforce group conformity—such as ostracism, refusal to deal, and moral
condemnation—can also be brought into play.  See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 30.
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tually beneficial forms of social cooperation that would not otherwise sponta-
neously arise.34
IV
GROUP COOPERATION AND THE “DESERVING/UNDESERVING” DISTINCTION
Robert Sugden’s description of the mutual insurance game is indeterminate
in important respects.  It says little about the precise terms and requirements for
participation in a mutual insurance collective under specific economic condi-
tions.  Who is expected to contribute (that is, who must function as a donor)
and how much?  What risks are being insured against?  Who is eligible to join
the group, and under what circumstances?  This section seeks to show how Sug-
den’s insights would apply where group members have access to labor markets.
It suggests that where individuals face the choice whether or not to work for
pay, an informal scheme of mutual cooperation will tend to adopt the rule that
the able-bodied (that is, those who are not obviously incapable of gainful em-
ployment) will ordinarily be expected to generate revenues through productive
activity and then to contribute a portion of their earnings to the common fund.
Eligibility for benefits will be confined to those who, through no fault of their
own, are unable to work at all or cannot contribute to the collective by gener-
ating a surplus over and above what is necessary to maintain themselves at the
most basic level.
It is possible to imagine setting up a common pool mutual aid or mutual “in-
surance” fund out of which persons can draw if and when they no longer want
to work.  Disbursing benefits to the voluntarily idle amounts to preserving eligi-
bility to participate in the collective by receiving money from the fund, despite
the recipients’ deliberate decision not to donate.  That would amount to permit-
ting players to choose when and how often to defect from cooperation with no
adverse consequences attached.  That is equivalent to suspending punishment
for refusal to cooperate with the group, which is inconsistent with strong reci-
procity.  Not only does permitting persons on their own motion to choose
whether and when to contribute to the fund amount to abandoning the equilib-
rium strategy of strong reciprocity, but it can also be regarded as suspending a
fundamental feature of the mutual insurance paradigm.  By definition, insur-
ance exists to guard against uncontrollable risk.35  A mutual aid collective, like
any insurance fund, would have a hard time sustaining itself if members were
given full discretion to determine how much to contribute and how much to
draw out of the common pool.  Because the potential for free-riding would be
unlimited, the fund would soon run out of money and the cooperative arrange-
34. For an important and ground-breaking discussion of commitment mechanisms, and the role of
emotions in motivating behaviors that facilitate mutual cooperation, see FRANK, supra note 31, passim
and at 221-26; see also id. at 224 (“The commitment model . . . holds that decisions about cooperation
are based not on reason but on emotion.”).
35. See SUGDEN, supra note 20, at 123-28 (explaining that the mutual insurance game invoves pro-
tection against a random event.)
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ment would collapse.  In sum, it should be apparent that tolerating voluntary
self-qualification for aid is inconsistent with sustaining a voluntary cooperative
arrangement designed to provide economic assistance to members in times of
need.  The stability of such an arrangement would appear to depend on adopt-
ing the rule that all able-bodied members—defined as those capable of making
a productive contribution—will be expected to work towards enhancing social
wealth.
Within the welfare context, the suspension of the rule of reciprocity and the
adoption of a rule of self-qualification would correspond to incorporating a
static notion of need in which assistance is forthcoming even when poverty is
due to unwillingness to work or to work hard enough to support oneself.  As al-
ready suggested, however, a stable, voluntary, mutual aid society cannot survive
the adoption of a principle of unconditional poor relief that allows individuals
to decide for themselves whether or not to function as productive members of
the group.  Rather, informal mutual aid collectives will tend to abide by the rule
that those who are able to engage in productive activity must do so, and only
those unable to work will be excused.  Members must donate to the collective
unless they are incapacitated by bad luck, in which case they may qualify as re-
cipients.  If work is what enables individuals to contribute, then members will
be expected to work—and contribute to the commons—unless they are involun-
tarily unemployed or rendered incapable of work.  The analysis suggests that
something roughly like present-day welfare work requirements will be an essen-
tial feature of any stable mutual aid game.
V
REACTIVE ATTITUDES AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF  PUBLIC WELFARE
PROGRAMS
The analysis so far suggests that human beings have evolved a psychology
that supports the formation of stable cooperative ventures.  The speculation is
that those ventures represented a “fitness-enhancing” adaptation.  It is possible,
for example, that in past primitive environments individuals capable of coming
together in stable arrangements of mutual aid had a better chance to survive
(and reproduce) than those incapable.  The analysis also suggests that, where
the purpose of sharing is to insure against economic want, group members will
not be allowed to choose when to draw upon the group’s resources.  A rule of
self-qualification will produce a “tragedy of the commons” by encouraging in-
discriminate withdrawals from the pool and by prompting group members to
defect.  Stability of informal cooperative groups requires that members be ex-
pected to produce, contribute, and support themselves if they are able to do so,
and permits dependency on others only for bad luck, disability, or misfortune.
These terms of eligibility amount to adopting a dynamic notion of need that
recognizes a distinction between deserving and undeserving beneficiaries.
Although judgmental attitudes based on these distinctions might evolve
over time and come to figure quite prominently in informal settings, it does not
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follow that such attitudes will carry over to poor relief schemes mandated by
government.  As the analysis in Part VIII infra indicates, strong governments
can coerce citizens to contribute to others’ support without their consent.  Be-
cause the taxing power can effectively perform the stabilizing function other-
wise performed by group norms in informal settings, governments can mandate
group-sharing arrangements even on terms that violate reciprocity conventions.
In the teeth of political innovations that make continued adherence to the rule
of reciprocity unnecessary, will citizens then abandon these norms?
This section suggests that they will not.  It argues that norms of strong reci-
procity informs citizens’ reactions to modern institutions that perform functions
similar to informal self-help groups.  One premise of evolutionary psychology is
that similar social situations trigger common social, emotional, and psychologi-
cal responses.  Arrangements for charging the collective with the economic
support of individuals, whether through informal cooperation or within the
modern welfare state, will elicit a typical cluster of sentiments because a com-
mon psychology underwrites how persons who call upon group assistance are
judged by others.  In effect, the basic emotions that regulated group coopera-
tion in more primitive environments will continue to dominate our response to
more modern arrangements for group responsibility today.
These insights predict that themes of reciprocity and responsibility will loom
large in the politics of welfare in modern industrial states.  Because citizens who
are taxed to support public welfare programs will perceive themselves as being
called upon to join a collective for the protection of all, they will be unre-
lentingly vigilant against evidence of free-riding.  They will tend to favor rules
that require everyone to contribute as much and draw out as little as they rea-
sonably can.  The common theme will be that people must support and help
themselves if they are able, and must not allow themselves to become needy if
they can avoid it.  Those whose dependency is deemed unnecessary, excessive,
or avoidable will elicit hostility and indignation.  The need to judge what per-
sons seeking benefits can do or have done for themselves or others will drive a
keen interest in the behavior and conduct of would-be beneficiaries.  Persons
who violate the rules against unnecessary dependency on the group will be
judged undeserving of public assistance, and the majority will seek to deny them
aid.  Only persons who are genuinely unable to support themselves, or who
have special needs, will be deemed deserving of benefits.  Voters will thus frown
on policies grounded in a static concept of need and will favor a dynamic con-
ception that takes account of personal effort and conduct.  Although the defini-
tion of who is able to work may vary with time, place, economics, and culture, it
can be predicted that the definition will not be left within the control of poten-
tial beneficiaries.36  Eligibility will turn on status (such as youth, old age, or par-
36. The tendency to disfavor help for persons needy by choice rather than chance nevertheless
leaves room for wide variations in views about when self-help is feasible or reasonable.  The demand
for reciprocity is thus consistent with a range of cultural and political responses to individual circum-
stances and with historical shifts on the margins in the categories classified as deserving or undeserving.
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enthood) or luck (illness, disability, or involuntary unemployment), but not on
what is perceived to lie within the potential recipients’ control.  To structure the
system otherwise would be to license free-riding, which would elicit the resent-
ment of the group.
Studies of voter preferences provide support for these predictions about at-
titudes towards public welfare programs.37  Based on extensive public opinion
surveys, Martin Gilens notes that most voters understand “that people cannot
always support themselves,” and agree “that when individuals are in need the
government has a responsibility to help.”38  Most want the government to assist
those who are genuinely “trying to make it on their own.”39  However, public
generosity does not extend to those who take “advantage of the system.”40  Most
voters are unwilling to offer assistance to those who, through lack of diligence
or imprudent conduct, are perceived to free-ride on the work of others.  Persons
who do not try hard enough “to make it on their own”41 are viewed with suspi-
cion and disdain.  Furthermore, Gilens’ surveys suggest that opposition to long-
standing welfare policies is based largely on the perception that most welfare
recipients do not try hard enough to support themselves.  As Gilens summa-
rizes:
the focus of considerable public anger and resentment is not the principle of govern-
ment support for the needy, but the perception that most people currently receiving
welfare are undeserving.  While no one factor can fully account for the public’s oppo-
sition to welfare, the most important single component is this widespread belief that
most welfare recipients would rather sit home and collect benefits than work hard to
support themselves.42
These findings comport with other recent surveys of attitudes toward wel-
fare.  A report compiled by the interest group Public Agenda finds that most
American voters believe that the government should help the needy but that
The perception of individuals’ ability and duty to engage in self-support will tend to vary with fac-
tors ranging from dominant notions about determinism versus individual responsibility, to conceptions
about the fair economic and personal preconditions for responsible choice, to understandings about
individual versus structural causes of poverty and unemployment, to prevailing economic conditions
bearing on subgroups’ opportunities for self-support and self-betterment, to perceptions about the roles
of women and men.  For example, the populace may have a very different attitude toward poor relief
during the depths of a depression than during boom times.  Mothers of young children are more likely
to be perceived as deserving if mothers are not generally expected to work and reproduction is viewed
either as a right or as inevitable.  See infra text accompanying notes 60-76 (discussing welfare policies
for single mothers).
37. Bowles and Gintis also discuss the connection between reciprocity norms and modern welfare
politics.  See Bowles & Gintis, Homo Reciprocans, supra note 28.  These authors also suggest that
norms of reciprocity are supplemented by a “basic needs generosity,” which recognizes the entitlement
of the most destitute to subsistence from the government.  Id. at 10-12.  It is not clear, however,
whether the authors think that this commitment is conditioned on recipients’ self-help efforts.  If so,
basic needs generosity would simply represent a logical extension of reciprocity requirements.  Cf., e.g.,
Stuart White, Three Questions, BOSTON REV., Dec. 1998-Jan. 1999, at 22-23.
38. GILENS, supra note 3, at 5.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at 4, 4-8.
42. Id. at 2-3.
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aid should extend only to those who cannot take care of themselves.43  Among
those expected to work are mothers, whom strong majorities believe should
“not be allowed to stay home and care for their children.”44  This study confirms
that although the public has “a sense of responsibility and obligation towards
the less fortunate in their society,” most voters agree that those seeking assis-
tance must also “assume some obligation in return,” must “prove themselves
worthy of help,” and must “work towards independence.”45  In a similar vein,
sociologist Alan Wolfe concludes from voter interviews “that there is no belief
more strongly held in America than the belief that welfare should go only to
those who deserve it.”46  The deserving include those willing to look diligently
for work, to work hard at a job, and to exercise reproductive responsibility.47
Likewise, David Miller, in a recent book on social justice, concludes that “the
nineteenth-century distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor
is still alive and well.”48  Based on surveys of attitudes toward welfare in the
United States and Britain, Miller states that “people tend to be strongly con-
cerned that the needy not be responsible for their neediness, either in the sense
that they have brought their needs upon themselves, or in the sense that they
could escape them with a little effort.”49
As noted, one theme that emerges from these surveys is that most citizens,
at least in this country, recognize a collective responsibility to aid the poor.
Most express willingness to pay taxes to help those who are genuinely unable to
support themselves.50  That willingness persists even when conditions make
maintaining welfare programs especially expensive or burdensome.  Martin
Gilens observes that
contrary to popular perceptions, public support for welfare spending does not decline
during economic downturns.  Hard times . . . do not elicit from the middle class a self-
interested concern with minimizing taxes or a resentment over paying for welfare.  On
the contrary, national economic adversity leads to a greater sense that poor people are
the victims of circumstances beyond their control and hence to greater support for
welfare.51
These observations suggest that voter ideology and normative commit-
ments, rather than rational self-interest narrowly defined, are the primary de-
43. See FARKAS ET AL., supra note 3, at 16-20.
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id. at 17.
46. ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS REALLY
THINK ABOUT GOD, COUNTRY, FAMILY, RACISM, WELFARE, IMMIGRATION, HOMOSEXUALITY,
WORK, THE RIGHT, THE LEFT, AND EACH OTHER 204 (1998).
47. See id. at 205-07.
48. DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 76 (1999) (citing N. Jaffe, Attitudes toward
Public Welfare Programs and Recipients in the United States, in L.M. SALAMON, WELFARE: THE
ELUSIVE CONSENSUS APP. (1978); see also JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT
INEQUALITY: AMERICANS’ VIEWS OF WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE 152–58 (1986); J. MACK &
S. LANSLEY, POOR BRITAIN 209-21 (1985).
49. MILLER, supra note 48, at 76.
50. See, e.g., WOLFE, supra note 46, at 204.
51. GILENS, supra note 3, at 5.
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terminants of voters’ views toward public welfare programs.  As Gilens reports,
“the desire to save taxpayer dollars consistently emerges as a low priority in the
public’s thinking about welfare reform.”52  Although a small number of respon-
dents point to cutting costs as the most important goal of welfare reform, most
would be willing to pay higher taxes for programs that help welfare recipients
help themselves.53 Moreover, support for welfare programs does not abate when
times are hard, but is strongest when the economy sours and the burden on tax-
payers is greatest.  The best explanation for this pattern is that voter prefer-
ences in this area are not primarily a function of what programs cost and
whether taxpayers see themselves as benefiting directly.  Rather, the popularity
of poor relief waxes with the perception that many poor are victims of circum-
stance, and wanes when the poor are believed to have ample opportunities to
better themselves.  As Gilens suggests, these patterns are consistent with a
“small role [for] economic self-interest in explaining opposition to welfare
spending,”54 and a large role for beliefs about fairness and reciprocal obligation.
These observations also help explain why cheap welfare programs such as
Aid for Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) are unpopular, while ex-
pensive programs like Social Security, which consumes a large chunk of the fed-
eral budget, are favorites of the voting public.  Although the wider dissemina-
tion of benefits under the Old Age program may account for some of this
difference, another explanation is that AFDC, but not Social Security, is viewed
as violating reciprocity norms that most voters accept.  There is ample evidence
that these norms exert an important influence apart from voters’ perceptions of
the costs of these programs to them or to persons like them.55
52. Id. at 192.
53. See id. at 187-88, 192.
54. Id. at 192.
55. Voters may also oppose federal anti-poverty programs from a fear that the programs promote
deviant behaviors, including idleness, dependency, drug use, crime, and out-of-wedlock childbearing.  If
voters perceive these behaviors as imposing costs on themselves, their opposition will, to that extent,
reflect self-interest.  Most certainly, the assertion that welfare causes poverty, social pathology, and
family breakdown is highly contested, and it is difficult to know whether these fears are a more impor-
tant source of opposition to welfare than moralistic indignation against perceived free-riding and “tak-
ing advantage.”  This suggests that, in shaping political outlooks on welfare, “irrational” concerns with
fairness and reciprocity dominate more “rational” factors, such as actuarially sound calculations of ex-
pected risks of future destitution and costs of supporting others.
Another factor that may help explain the pattern of support for different programs is that, contrary
to a core assumption of the mutual insurance game, see generally SUGDEN, supra note 20, not all voters
are equally at risk of falling into poverty.  This minimizes the insurance payoff for them, and leaves
more room for selfish motives.  Nonetheless, the data suggests that voters’ views are only minimally
responsive to this differential in risk.  The preoccupation in voter surveys with fairness and reciprocity
concerns does not vary significantly with social class, and the well-to-do are not less supportive of wel-
fare reform than welfare recipients themselves.  See, e.g., FARKAS ET AL., supra, note 3, at 44-47 (com-
paring views of the general public and welfare recipients).  This suggests that “irrational” concerns with
fairness and reciprocity dominate more “rational” factors, such as actuarially sound calculations of ex-
pected risks of future destitution and costs of supporting others, in shaping political outlooks on wel-
fare.
Yet another factor grounded in self-interest that may help account for popular support for public
welfare may be the perception that distributing resources to the least well-off ameliorates negative ex-
ternalities generated by a large destitute population.  See Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and
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To summarize, the pattern of attitudes toward public welfare programs is
not best explained by voters’ narrow calculations of self-interest.  Rather, the
notion that normative expectations regarding dependency dominate voters’
views provides a better account.  Adherence to those norms can arguably be
explained as the application of attitudes that were essential to maintaining col-
lective forms of sharing throughout human history.  Although features of mod-
ern welfare programs diverge in important respects from collective, voluntary
mutual aid arrangements, elements common to all schemes of mutual support
and redistribution of resources—elements shared by informal cooperatives as
well as complex modern welfare programs—may tap into attitudes forged in a
more primitive era.  The impulses of generosity toward the faultlessly helpless,
and of stinginess toward the willfully needy, may stem from a period when such
sentiments were adaptive in facilitating the emergence of stable arrangements
for reciprocal assistance.  Whether as a matter of cultural or biological evolu-
tion, norms consistent with these impulses can be expected to exert some con-
trol over our responses today.
VI
WELFARE REFORM: THE TRIUMPH OF ORDINARY POLITICS?
This account helps make sense of the longstanding public dissatisfaction
with the design of federal relief for the poor and the current popularity of
Clinton’s PRA legislation.  The data suggests that a majority of voters favor
collective responsibility for the poor and want to help the poor become eco-
nomically independent.  They are reluctant, however, to support needy persons
who show little interest in supporting themselves.  Because an important route
to self-sufficiency is work, the public can be expected to favor policies that en-
courage or require able-bodied persons to engage in paid labor or to ally them-
selves with someone who does.56  Moreover, as Gilens suggests, dissatisfaction
with existing policies and support for reform correlate with the perception that
many beneficiaries are “taking advantage of the system” by doing too little for
themselves.  All of these observations help explain the popularity of President
Clinton’s initiative.
Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare Conundrum, 1994 U. WIS. L. REV. 235, 267-69, 274-76 (using
game-theoretic models to argue that welfare programs are not a zero-sum game and that collective
benefits from these programs in modern societies are potentially felt at all levels).  Cf. DONALD F.
NORRIS & LYKE THOMPSON, THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 11 (1995) (describing the politics
of redistribution, because it involves “taking resources away from one group and giving them to oth-
ers,” as inherently “conflictual” and as pitting “one section of the community against another”).  The
belief that anti-poverty measures generate modest collective gains may help fuel public support for
government welfare programs, even to the point of overriding a commitment to the deserving and un-
deserving distinction.  For example, a belief that poverty encourages crime may make voters more
willing to provide money to the poor regardless of self-help potential, on the theory that resources re-
duce the temptation to break the law even among the able-bodied poor.
56. See discussion infra notes 60-76 (comparing attitudes toward married homemakers and unmar-
ried mothers on welfare).
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The AFDC program, which has been the mainstay of federal relief for the
poor since the New Deal, initially embodied expectations consistent with strong
reciprocity, but only in light of customs, understandings, and social practices
prevailing at the time of enactment.  Because the program was confined to sin-
gle parents with children, it denied benefits to most able-bodied men.  The ex-
pectation that able-bodied women would work was not part of the program’s
design at its inception.  On the contrary, the program implemented the under-
standing that single mothers should personally care for their children, which re-
quired them to depend on public support. Twenty-five years after the enact-
ment of the AFDC legislation, however, the consensus that single mothers
should depend on the government began to fade as more mothers started to
work and the number of out-of wedlock births exploded.  Beginning in the
1960s, Congress revised the authorizing legislation to incorporate work incen-
tives and programs.  Until the 1980s, these were mostly voluntary and were only
sporadically implemented.57  Even under the Reagan Administration, and de-
spite decisive changes in popular attitudes toward mothers in the labor markets,
formal self-help requirements under AFDC remained weak.58  Dissatisfaction
with AFDC grew as changing mores fueled the perception that many mothers
were violating the unwritten conditions of strong self-help.59  This led to sus-
tained calls for more stringent rules of eligibility, including serious enforcement
of work requirements and time limits on benefits.  In keeping with voters’
views, reformers recommended a shift in emphasis from cash benefits to pro-
grams that facilitate employment, including child care and transportation subsi-
dies, training, child support, and other work-related services.  All of these fea-
tures have found their way into the new welfare reform package.
Popular acceptance of basic norms of reciprocity can also help explain the
apparent paradox of widespread support for work requirements for single
mothers on welfare, coupled with the general approval (or at least lack of dis-
approval) of married mothers’ staying home to care for their own children.  It is
sometimes claimed that public condemnation of single mothers’ “dependency”
on the government is inconsistent with applauding married mothers’ “depend-
57. See LAWRENCE MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT 149-56 (1986) (explaining administration of
the JOBS and WIN programs); Lawrence Mead, Welfare Employment, in THE NEW PATERNALISM:
SUPERVISORY APPROACHES TO POVERTY 39 (Lawrence M. Mead ed., 1997) (same); see also, e.g., J. L.
Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administration of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in Vir-
ginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818 (1971) (detailing broad variation in administration of AFDC in different
counties in Virginia during the 1970s).
58. See FARKAS ET AL., supra note 3, at 21-22 (describing strong support for paid employment for
welfare mothers); GILENS, supra note 3, at 178-87 (describing changing norms surrounding mothers
working; and introduction of work programs for AFDC).
59. As already suggested, see supra note 55, growing opposition to support for single mothers may
also have stemmed from the belief that AFDC hurts the very people it is designed to help, or that it en-
courages out-of-wedlock childbearing, discourages marriage and male responsibility, and indirectly fos-
ters lawlessness and crime.  See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL
POLICY (1984); MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT, supra note 57, at 149-56.
